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O V E R LI N E  
Preparing ocean governance for the 
challenges of species on the move 
New policy approaches are needed to prevent international conflict over geographic 
shifts in fished species  
By Malin L. Pinsky1*, Gabriel Reygondeau2, Richard Caddell3,4, Juliano Palacios-Abrantes2, Jessica Spijkers5,6, and William W. L. Cheung2 
The ocean has provided food to 
humans for millennia, remains a 
critical source of nutrition for billions 
of people today, and has the potential 
to yield further food, profits, and 
employment in the future (1). We 
believe fisheries now face a 
significant new challenge, however, 
as climate change drives the ocean to 
conditions  not experienced 
historically. The rapid, locational 
shifts in marine animals driven by a 
warming ocean represent an 
emerging situation for which local, 
national, regional, and international 
fisheries are substantially 
underprepared. Fish and other 
animals have already moved at a rate 
averaging 70 km decade-1 (2), and 
these shifts are expected to continue 
or accelerate (3). We show here that 
many species will likely shift across 
national boundaries in the coming 
decades, creating the potential for 
conflict over newly shared resources. 
A shifting fish stock aggravates 
existing fisheries challenges because 
it contravenes the ǲclear boundariesǳ 
principle for sustainable governance 
of common pool resources, eroding 
incentives for conservation when 
new free riders gain access to a 
resource (4, 5). Stock shifts can 
incentivize regional overharvesting 
as actors scramble to exploit a 
perceived disappearing resource. Similarly, a 
stock that moves to straddle national 
boundaries may find itself in ǲdouble jeopardy,ǳ exposed to unsustainable 
competitive harvesting (5). The governance 
challenges posed by shifting marine animal 
distributions have been recognized in certain 
cases, but the scope and magnitude of this 
problem has remained unclear and there 
have been few efforts to address the issues. 
Shifting fishes already caused conflict 
International law recognizes that 
cooperation is necessary for the 
management of shared stocks, yet fisheries 
disputes remain commonplace. In fact, 
fisheries—alongside maritime boundaries 
and other resources—are a leading cause of 
militarized disputes between democratic 
states in the post-WWII period (6). 
The so-called Ǯmackerel warǯ erupted in 
2007 when the northeast Atlantic Mackerel 
stock (Scomber scombrus)—a fishery then 
managed by the European Union, Norway, 
and Faroe Islands—shifted into Icelandǯs 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (7). Conflict 
erupted over appropriate allocations among 
the actors, compounded by disagreement 
about the drivers and therefore the expected 
duration of the shift. In the absence of 
cooperation, the mackerel stock became 
increasingly overfished (7). 
Shifting species have caused conflict even 
between countries that historically 
cooperate closely. During a warm period in 
the 1980s and 1990s, United States catches 
of Pacific salmon (Oncorhynchus spp.) 
increased more than ten-fold and included 
increased interceptions of Canadian-bound 
salmon (5). Canadian fisheries retaliated by 
targeting salmon migrating to spawn in the 
USA. Six years of rancorous disagreement 
passed before a new joint management 
agreement was concluded. 
Shifting species distributions also 
present internal challenges for nations. 
Blueline tilefish (Caulolatilus microps) were 
historically caught and managed south of the 
Virginia-North Carolina border, USA. When 
tilefish appeared further north, a fishery 
exploited the stock for nearly a decade 
without regulation. This situation only 
changed in 2015 with emergency rules from 
the National Marine Fisheries Service. 
These cases exemplify a general pattern: 
existing fisheries management and 
governance is largely predicated on 
population geographies that remain broadly 
static through time. Challenges emerge when 
stock distributions become less predictable 
and are compounded when states act 
unilaterally to exploit the resultant windfall. 
The magnitude of future challenges 
The oceans have already absorbed 93% 
of the heat from climate change (8), and if 
future species geographic shifts exceed 
historical variation, adjustment to existing 
ocean governance will be needed. 
Alternatively, future geographic shifts could 
be sufficiently limited to retain stocks 
primarily under the jurisdiction of those 
countries currently managing them. The 
extent to which future shifts in species 
distributions will generate newly shared fish 
stocks and increase the potential for conflict, 
however, has not been clear.  
We therefore examined future shifts in 
the distribution of 892 commercially 
important marine fish and invertebrates in relation to the worldǯs EEZs (see 
Supplementary Materials). Instead of 
precisely forecasting future changes, the 
projections help delineate plausible 
scenarios that illustrate the extent of future 
challenges. Comparing 1950-2014 against 
2090-2100, we found that many of the worldǯs EEZs are likely to receive one to five 
new, climate-driven transboundary stocks 
by the end of the century (Fig. 1A). Up to ten 
new stocks were projected for some EEZs in 
east Asia, a region where new transboundary 
stocks could exacerbate maritime relations 
already complicated by disputed territories, 
overlapping EEZ claims, and illegal fishing. 
The number of EEZs with new 
transboundary stocks was expected to reach 
46±8 (±standard error) or 60±4 by 2060 
(57±4 or 85±22 by 2080) under strong 
mitigation (Representative Concentration 
1 Dept. of Ecology, Evolution, and Natural Resources, 
Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA. 
malin.pinsky@rutgers.edu.  
2 Institute for the Oceans and Fisheries, University of 
British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada. 
g.reygondeau@oceans.ubc.ca, j.palacios@oceans.ubc.ca, 
and w.cheung@oceans.ubc.ca. 
3 Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea, Utrecht 
University, Utrecht, Netherlands. 
4 School of Law and Politics, Cardiff University, UK. 
caddellr@cardiff.ac.uk. 
5 Stockholm Resilience Center, Stockholm University, 
Stockholm, Sweden. jessica.spijkers@su.se. 
6 Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for 
Coral Reef Studies, James Cook University, Queensland, 
Australia. 
* malin.pinsky@rutgers.edu  
                              sciencemag.org      SCIENCE    VOL. xxx  • galley printed 16 July, 2018  • •  For Issue Date: ???? 2 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
 
 
 
Pathway [RCP] 2.6) or business-as-usual 
(RCP 8.5) greenhouse gas emissions 
scenarios, respectively (Fig. 1B). Limiting 
greenhouse gas emissions would therefore 
reduce the potential for new fisheries 
conflicts. In total, new transboundary stocks 
were projected to be present in 23% (RCP 
2.6) to 35% (RCP 8.5) of global EEZs by 2100 
(Fig. 1A and 1B). In the tropics, fisheries will 
likely move out but not in, a process that 
creates additional food security concerns. 
Most countries were projected to receive 
1-30% of their potential fisheries catch from 
new stocks by 2100, but percentages were 
higher in temperate regions (e.g., Australia 
or countries around the Baltic and Bering 
Seas) and highest in shared Antarctic fishing 
grounds (92%). We note that past conflicts 
over even a single species with low catch 
volumes have been significant. 
Current governance frameworks 
have major gaps 
The current legal framework for the 
international regulation of fisheries does not 
directly account for fluctuating or changing 
distributions. The primary source of 
international obligations for the governance 
of global fisheries resources remains the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 
(UNCLOS) which entered into force in 1994. 
Under UNCLOS, states must ensure that 
fisheries in their EEZs are not endangered by 
overexploitation; hence national regulations 
for fishing could provide a basis for far-
sighted management of shifting stocks.  For ǲstraddling stocksǳ occurring in two 
or more EEZs, or within an EEZ and the high 
seas, UNCLOS obliges states to cooperate to 
establish necessary conservation and 
management measures. In 1995, the 
fisheries regime of UNCLOS was buttressed 
by the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA), 
which specifically applies to straddling and 
highly migratory stocks and entered into 
force in 2001. The UNFSA reinforced 
national obligations to cooperate and to 
apply a precautionary approach to fisheries. 
Notwithstanding its constructive influence 
on international fisheries law, the UNFSA has 
not focused attention upon shifting stocks. 
Regional fisheries management 
organizations (RFMOs) remain the primary 
vehicle through which straddling fish stocks 
are managed. Many RFMOs address single 
species such as tuna or salmon, however, 
and an influx of additional species lies 
beyond their individual remits. Despite 
recent progress, fish stocks in large parts of 
the global oceans are weakly managed—a 
trend that may be exacerbated by shifting 
distributions. Few bodies have established a 
clear position on the elaboration of 
regulations for new fisheries, a loophole that 
often allows newly fished stocks to be 
heavily exploited before meaningful 
standards are developed (9). Moreover, 
there has been little to no cooperation 
between RFMOs on the potential for future 
shared stocks, and limited interactions with 
other regional and sectoral regulators. 
Concerns also remain over the limited 
application of ecosystem-based 
management principles by RFMOs, including 
limited consideration of impacts on non-
focal species. 
Attempts to resolve conflicts judicially 
are largely untested, although shifting stocks 
could prompt judicial consideration in the 
future (legal processes in the mackerel 
dispute were discontinued by the 
contending parties). International courts and 
tribunals have been receptive to calls for 
more responsible stewardship of fish stocks 
and have adopted far-sighted allocation 
practices in individual cases. Nevertheless, 
they have historically accorded little 
consideration to environmental factors 
(climate or otherwise) in resolving territorial 
disputes, and shifting stocks have not played 
an overt role in boundary decisions to date. 
Likewise, there is little scope to revise 
jurisdictional entitlements in response to 
changing marine circumstances. Ultimately, 
it is also important to recognize that judicial 
decisions do not always resolve conflicts: 
China refused to participate in recent 
arbitration concerning the South China Sea, 
rendering fisheries relations unpredictable 
and vulnerable to unilateral actions around 
stock shifts in this region. 
Governance solutions for shifting fish 
Experience from past conflicts, the 
projected widespread emergence of new 
transboundary stocks, and the gaps in 
current governance frameworks all suggest 
that substantial new approaches are needed 
to forestall future conflict. The first step is for 
management authorities to plan ahead for 
cooperative management, which demands 
an emphasis on reliable projections of 
species shifts and of associated uncertainties. 
Negotiations over shared stocks are easier 
with mutually-agreed facts, which can be 
facilitated by data from multilateral or 
independent scientific bodies, notably the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC). All projections should be interpreted 
cautiously, however, given the high potential 
for abrupt thresholds and surprises in 
ecological systems. These inherent 
uncertainties complicate localized 
evaluations of the costs and benefits of 
cooperation (10, 11).  
For RFMOs, performance reviews 
provide an established process for such 
considerations, although success depends on 
capacity and a culture of critical reflection. 
Data-sharing with other bodies is also vital. 
The Commission for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
(CCAMLR) has been exemplary in this regard 
and has established collaborative 
arrangements with neighboring RFMOs to 
monitor the movement of stocks across 
regulatory frontiers. Crucially, CCAMLR has 
forged similar arrangements with other 
sectoral regulators to consider the 
prospective ecological footprint of a moving 
fishing industry.  
Cooperation must then extend beyond 
data-sharing to inform genuinely 
collaborative management where necessary. 
For example, to meet their responsibilities 
under UNCLOS and UNFSA, RFMOs must 
accept the prospect of shared oversight and 
agree on regulatory responsibilities for 
species with an increasing presence in 
neighboring areas. Overlapping stocks have 
already generated tensions, exemplified in 
the 1990s between the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries Organization (NAFO) and the 
North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 
(NEAFC) until shared responsibilities were 
implemented. CCAMLR has taken a different 
and more constructive approach to 
cooperation, in part by imposing greater 
precautionary oversight of new fisheries, 
including for tuna displaced by ocean 
warming (9). Data-sharing and appropriate 
co-management can further inform other 
vital regulatory approaches, including area-
based management tools and no-take zones 
to reduce pressure on shifting stocks. RFMOs 
have proved adept at implementing 
precautionary oversight for emerging 
fisheries, based on strict catch limits, prior 
approval and a graduated exploitation of 
previously unfished areas and species (9). 
Prevailing management mentalities also 
remain a fundamental challenge, notably the perception that one party ǲwinsǳ and the other ǲlosesǳ when a stock shifts 
geographically, an asymmetry that can 
undermine cooperation (12). Game theory 
provides inviting lessons for incentivizing 
cooperation, including broadening the scope 
of negotiations to include non-fish resources 
(5), albeit at the risk of reducing fisheries to a 
mere bargaining chip as suggested by the 
Brexit negotiations. In the case of the US-
Canada Pacific Salmon Treaty, however, 
contributions to a conservation fund helped 
stabilize relations, creating an alternative 
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avenue for compensation often termed a ǲside paymentǳ (13). Similar approaches are 
illustrated by Norway and Russia swapping 
fisheries access within EEZs to balance shifts 
in shared stocks, an important example of 
flexibility in co-managing Arctic resources. 
Trading herring, blue whiting, or other 
fishery access to help resolve the Icelandic 
mackerel dispute has also been suggested 
(14). The value of side-payments suggests 
that new bilateral or multilateral 
agreements concerning shifting fisheries 
will be more effective if negotiated at higher 
political levels. Presently, however, 
multilateral processes generally focus on 
discrete issues to help secure widespread 
support. For instance, it is being actively 
debated whether fisheries should be 
included or excluded from ongoing United 
Nations negotiations on the conservation 
and sustainable use of marine biodiversity 
beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ), despite 
this process expressly seeking further 
integration across sectors of marine 
governance. 
Compounding this proprietorial 
approach are concerns that access to current 
and prospective RFMOs is restricted to those with a ǲreal interestǳ in the stock, with 
participatory rights zealously guarded by 
current constituents (14, 15). The North 
Atlantic RFMOs, which are facing geographic 
shifts in a number of important fisheries, are 
currently closed to new members (9, 15). 
Many existing fisheries are based on 
principles of zonal attachment and relative 
stability, with national allocations reliant 
upon historical presence. A first step 
towards more adaptable fisheries would be 
objective and regularly updated allocations 
of catch or effort to reflect changes in stock 
distributions. An intriguing, alternative 
approach would be to develop fisheries 
permits that are tradeable across political 
boundaries, as considered to some extent by 
the International Commission for the 
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) and 
by NAFO (15). Regions with disputed 
maritime boundaries will remain especially 
prone to conflict, and shifting stocks may 
require additional consideration in the 
boundary delimitation process or bespoke 
arrangements between states over 
contested resources. 
Climate-driven shifts in marine species 
distributions represent a growing 
governance issue affecting states in all 
regions of the world. An alternative future of 
widespread non-cooperative management 
over new transboundary stocks risks 
extensive overfishing, decline in global food 
and livelihood provisioning from the ocean, 
fractured international relationships, and 
political conflicts that could spill over into 
other, non-fishery areas of international 
politics. However, the challenges can be 
mitigated through far-sighted governance 
strategies. With adaptable agreements 
between states, we have hope that ocean 
fisheries can continue to provide the myriad 
nutritional, livelihood, and economic 
opportunities relied upon by billions of 
people around the world. 
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Fig. 1. Ocean warming will drive the appearance 
of new transboundary fisheries around the world. 
(A) Map highlights Exclusive Economic Zones 
(EEZs) projected to contain one or more new 
fishery stocks by 2100, as compared to the 
distribution of fish stocks in 1950-2014. The 
projections represent an ensemble average across 
three earth system models under the high 
greenhouse gas emissions scenario (RCP 8.5). (B) 
The number of EEZs with new transboundary 
stocks increased approximately linearly with 
increases in global temperature. The extent of 
warming and number of EEZs were greater under 
a high greenhouse gas emissions scenario (RCP 8.5, 
red), and lower under a low emissions scenario 
(RCP 2.6, blue). The thin lines are projections from 
each of three earth system models, while the thick 
lines represent the average across models.  
 
